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language as support for admissibility of juror testimony demonstrating
a "mental bias" on the part of one or more jurors. This language is
available in support of both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 107
Second, if the evidence is excluded under Rule 606(b), attorneys should
address the dichotomy between Rule 606(b)'s exclusions andMcCleskey's
requirements for proving a race discrimination claim. In this situation,
attorneys should distinguish Tanner and refer to the analysis of the
district court in Dobbs. Attorneys should argue that ajuror can testify to
statements and deliberations at trial, notwithstanding Rule 606(b), if the
"evidence of a juror's racial prejudice is so strong that the death penalty
appears to have been imposed on the basis of the defendant's race." 108
D. Argue for a More Stringent Standard
Under the Virginia Constitution
Several state courts have considered imposing higher obligations
under their own constitutions than the United States Supreme Court has
required when contemplating statistical claims of racial discrimination
in capital cases. 10 9 Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution
provides that "the right to be free from any governmental discrimination
upon the basis of... race.., shall not be abridged."' 1 0 Although this
clause has been held to be no broader than the Equal Protection Clause
107 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1574.
109 See, e.g., State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.) (Blackmar,
J., dissenting) (advocating that the Missouri Supreme Court should "be
mindful of appearances" and reduce a death sentence to life imprison-
ment without probation or parole pursuant to a state statute, notwith-
standingMcCleskey),cert. denied, 484U.S. 933 (1987);Statev.Koedatich,
548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988) (Handler, J., dissenting) (stating that, despite
McCleskey, "[t]he course of federal jurisprudence should not distract
state courts from an independent evaluation of the issue," and concluding
that the New Jersey constitution forbids administration of the death
penalty in a racially discriminatory manner), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017
(1989); State v. Green, 406 S.E.2d 852 (N.C. 1991) (rejecting a state and
federal constitutional claim of racial discrimination premised on statis-
tical evidence, but leaving the door open on the state claim, rejecting it
on the basis that "the statistical studies offered by the defendant do not
relate specifically to North Carolina or to the district in which the
defendant was tried"); People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk,
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,1t 1
Virginia attorneys should make race discrimination challenges under
both the Virginia and federal constitutions, if for no other reason than to
draw attention to the problems of race discrimination which continue to
plague the death penalty in Virginia. 112 Moreover, such a comprehen-
sive challenge acts as a safeguard against potential arguments of proce-
dural default, arguments which courts have so frequently embraced as a
means of precluding post-conviction review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has severely limited the
opportunities to challenge a death sentence based on racial discrimina-
tion, the opportunities have not been completely eviscerated. This article
has provided several avenues through which such a claim might be
presented to a court. Attorneys should be prepared to assign racially
discriminatory patterns more specifically to individuals who can be held
accountable for the entire pattern. Attorneys must also be alert to any
case-specific evidence which might show that racial bias has played a
part in their clients' trials. Finally, statistical evidence of state-wide
disparities in the administration of Virginia's death penalty should be
assigned as error under the Virginia Constitution.
J., dissenting) (arguing that, where a defendant has shown that similarly
situated individuals have received lesser sentences, the defendant's
death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate, under either the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution).
110 Va. Const. Art. I, § 11.
111 See, e.g.,Archerv. Mayes,213 Va. 633,194 S.E.2d 707 (1973).
112 See Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,555, 364 S.E.2d
483,490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). In Turner, the defendant
proffered a statistical study relating to the discriminatory impact of the
death penalty in Virginia. After Turner originally made his claim, the
United States Supreme Court decided McCleskey. Turner admitted that
McCleskey prevented a defendant from relying on statistics alone to
prove a statute invalid, but nevertheless asked the Supreme Court of
Virginia "'to hold to the contrary."' Turner, 234 Va. at 555,364 S.E.2d
at 483. The court stated simply: "We decline this request." Id. It is
unclear whether Turner's request was premised on the United States
Constitution or Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution.
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AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF LAW: THE USE OF
UNADJUDICATED ACTS IN CAPITAL SENTENCING':'
BY: LAURA J. FENN
Picture yourself,'you are tired, exhausted, after so many days sitting with the same eleven people in that jury box. It is a strange
place to be. You didn't expect the courtroom would look so much like a church. All week long you have been listening, your mind
alternately concentrating and wandering. You have heard testimony, testimony from experts,from witnesses,from family members,
even from the defendant himself. You have seen evidence, compelling and personal physical evidence from the crime scene, about
the victim, who is dead now. You have heard enough testimony and seen enough evidence to convince you and the eleven others that
this man was guilty of committing a horrible, brutal crime. This man is a murderer.
You have unanimously decided to convict the defendant of capital murder and now you must decide whether he should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or be sentenced to die.
You hear more evidence. You hear psychiatrists discussing the mental state of the defendant. You hear a sibling telling you
about the background of the defendant. The stories of child abuse and the testimony about the defendant's mental disturbance begin
to give you a glimpse into his background, a hint of how someone might have such a troubled upbringing that his behavior would
culminate in such a horrible act... not that it would excuse what was done, but that it becomes slightly more understandable;
understandable enough that you begin to change your mind, to think that perhaps death is not the best punishment.
But then you hear a jail cell mate relating stories about other things the defendant has done. He tells you that the defendant
boasted about another murder he committed. Maybe he tells you that the defendant bragged about "taking" a girl andforcing her
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to do as he wished. Or maybe he tells you that the defendant has a terrible temper and has, on many occasions, exploded into fits
of rage.
You hear this knowing you must decide whether the defendant has apotential to be violent, whether he would pose afuture threat
to society.
You are not told that the evidence you have just heard has not been established in a court of law. You are not warned that you
need not take the evidence into account unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that it actually occurred. You are not informed
that the evidence you have just heard may be mere speculation or fabrication.
All you know is that you now hear that the man you have just convicted of a horrible, brutal murder has committed other
horrendous crimes and gotten away with them. What could be more devastating - and more convincing?
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence of a defendant's prior unadjudicated conduct is admitted
at a capital sentencing trial so that the sentencer may hear all information
relevant to sentencing the defendant. 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia
has justified this rationale through the words of the United States
Supreme Court, "in determining the probability of a defendant's future
criminal conduct, it is 'essential... that the jury havebefore it all possible
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must
determine.' 2 Thus, the reasoning goes, although prior unadjudicated
acts generally are not admissible in the guilt phase of a capital trial
because the defendant's character is not at issue in the guilt phase,3 it is
precisely the defendant's character which is at issue for a sentencing jury
considering whether to impose the death penalty. In theory, this policy
is a means of ensuring that the sentencing decision will be appropriately
individualized, 4 but, in practice, it enables the Commonwealth to intro-
duce highly damaging yet slightly reliable evidence in pursuit of a capital
sentence.
Under the capital sentencing statutes in Virginia,5 the only limita-
tion currently placed on the admissibility of prior acts as aggravating
evidence is the trial judge's discretion in determining relevance. 6 And
because the focus of the inquiry is on the defendant's character, virtually
anything the defendant may have done can be argued as relevant. For
instance, Virginia courts have admitted as "relevant" to future danger-
ousness evidence of acts such as bigamy,7 attempting to use the victim's
bank card,8 and tampering with a vending machine. 9
While in theory it is ideal that jurors be afforded all relevant
*AUTHOR'S NOTE: As this article was going to press, the Vir-
ginia State legislature passed a bill requiring written notice to defendant
of prior unadjudicated conduct which the Commonwealth intends to
introduce at sentencing. Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.3:2 (1993). The
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse is developing a sample motion
which triggers the notice requirement, requests a reasonable time frame
for the notice and insists upon a continuing duty to notify.
1 "In the cases of trial byjury, evidence may be presented as to any
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence .... Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(B) (1990).
2 LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 593-94, 304 S.E.2d
644, 660 (1983) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976))
(emphasis in LeVasseur). See also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
998-1001 (1982).
3 See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986). Such evidence is admissible
at the guilt phase, however, if offered for a purpose other than to
demonstrate the defendant's character and propensity to commit the
crime charged. See Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia §§ 152, 153
(3d ed. 1988). See also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
4 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[E]vidence about the defendant's background and charac-
ter is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvan-
taged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse").
5 See infra Part II.
6 Note also that the same limit is placed upon the defendant offering
evidence in mitigation pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
information in sentencing a defendant, in practice, a number of problems
arise. This article will examine and explain why Virginia's current use
of unadjudicated acts should be reformed. Specifically, this article will
argue that Virginia's practice violates the defendant's rights under the
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting evidence which
is questionably relevant to the defendant's character and propensity for
future danger, is highly prejudicial, does not measure up to constitutional
safeguards for reliability, and precludes counsel from providing effec-
tive assistance at the penalty phase. Moreover, this article will explain
how defense counsel may attempt to limit the Commonwealth's use of
unadjudicated acts in any particular case.
II. THE LAW
The Commonwealth of Virginia has established a capital sentenc-
ing scheme whereby a defendant found guilty of capital murder10 is
subject to a penalty of life imprisonment or death.11 The sentencer may
not impose a sentence of death, however, unless the Commonwealth has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the two
statutory aggravating factors of "vileness" 12 or "future dangerous-
ness." 13 In assessing the defendant's propensity to commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a serious threat to society, the
sentencer is permitted to consider the defendant's "past criminal record
of convictions" 14 and "evidence of the prior history of the defendant or
of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which
he is accused." 15 The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently inter-
preted the statute as allowing the Commonwealth to use prior
and its progeny, as well as by Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) (1990). For
a thorough discussion of the use of mitigating evidence in Virginia, See
Hansen, Mitigation: An Outline of Law, Method and Strategy, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 29 (1992).
7 King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992).
8 Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482,404 S.E.2d 227 (1991).
9 Id.
10 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1991).
11 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (1990).
12 "Vileness" describes the defendant's conduct in committing the
offense for which he stands charged as "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-
264.4(C) (1990). For a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of
Virginia's vileness factor, see Lago, Litigating the 'Vileness' Factor in
Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991).
13 "Future dangerousness" describes the probability that the defen-
dant "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society." Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2,
19.2-264A(C) (1990).
14 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
15 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990); See Edmonds v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303,329 S.E.2d 807 (explaining that in making
future dangerousness determination, sentencer is entitled to consider not
only the defendant's past criminal record of convictions, but also any
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, the prior history of the
defendant or the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense, and the heinousness of the crime), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 975
(1985).
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2 - Page 33
unadjudicated criminal conduct as evidence of future dangerous-
ness.
16
Despite the Virginia Supreme Court's holdings, the United States
Supreme Court has never expressly declared that using a defendant's
prior unadjudicated activity to prove future dangerousness at the
penalty phase of a capital trial is constitutionally permissible. 17
Virginia's practice is particularly suspect compared to other states
because it admits unadjudicated acts with only the barest of procedural
safeguards; a state of affairs which raises serious constitutional ques-
tions on due process grounds.
III. RELIABILITY
A. The Constitutional Requirement of Greater
Reliability in Capital Sentencing
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that Virginia's sentencing
scheme provides sufficient measures for a jury to predict the future
dangerousness of a defendant. 18 However, when the Commonwealth
makes allegations of prior unadjudicated criminal activity in an
attempt to demonstrate future dangerousness, the jury is allowed to use
those accusations without regard to, and without instruction on, the
level or standard of proof necessary to decide whether those acts were
in fact committed by the defendant. 19 Without an articulated standard
of proof, the use of unadjudicated criminal conduct cannot be relevant
or reliable information about the defendant.
20
Allowing the Commonwealth to present such information for
jury consideration without burden of proof safeguards violates the
Supreme Court's procedural due process requirements in capital
cases. In California v. Ramos,2 1 the Court voiced its ongoing concern
for appropriate procedure in capital cases:
In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily
or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more
16 Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 385 S.E.2d 50
(1989). See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168,360 S.E.2d
361 (1987); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521,352 S.E.2d 342,
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va.
266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); Watkins
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985) (explaining
that although generally not admissible at guilt phase of a capital trial,
evidence of prior unadjudicated acts by defendant are allowed at
penalty phase for proof of future dangerousness), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1099 (1986); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401,329 S.E.2d
815 (1985); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124,314 S.E.2d 371,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
17 Sharp v. Texas, 488 U.S. 872, (1988) (denying certiorari on
the question of admissibility of defendant's prior unadjudicated be-
havior at capital sentencing); Miranda v. California, 486 U.S. 1038
(1988) (same); Devier v. Kemp, 484 U.S. 948 (1987) (same); Williams
v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (same).
18 Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844
(198 1) (holding that the aggravating factors subsection of the capital
sentencing statute has a commonsense meaning which a jury can
understand and thus supplies a sufficient standard for ajury to predict
future criminal conduct), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982).
19 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295,317,384 S.E.2d 785,
799 (1989) (rejecting the claim that such evidence was unreliable and
prejudicial because it failed to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
with the procedure by which the State imposes the death
sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays
before the jury as a basis for imposing death, once it has been
determined that the defendant falls within the category of
persons eligible for the death penalty.
22
The potential penalty of death makes capital crimes qualitatively
different than those crimes subjecting a defendant to a sentence of
years, 23 and the Supreme Court has determined that the unique nature
of the death penalty requires additional protection during pretrial, guilt
and sentencing stages. 24 The use of unadjudicated criminal conduct
in the penalty phase offends notions of reliability required by due
process as applied to capital sentencing proceedings.
B. Standard of Proof
1. The Need for Some Standard of Proof
Assuming unadjudicated act evidence is constitutionally admis-
sible, the most fundamental shortcoming in the Virginia scheme is the
lack of any burden of proof requirement. A defendant's death sentence
may end up resting upon ajury's consideration of an unadjudicated act
which the jury was not required to find had been committed beyond a
reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a
mere preponderance of the evidence. Instead, the jury is allowed to
use, without any guidance on reliability, the most inflammatory and
prejudicial type of evidence one could imagine on the issue of future
dangerousness - evidence such as an additional murder 25 - which
no jury will ever have found was committed by the defendant based
upon a legal instruction on burden of proof. Under prevailing United
States Supreme Court holdings, due process and the Eighth Amend-
ment would appear to require that such a finding be made beyond a
reasonable doubt.26 At a minimum, however, such a finding must be
made pursuant to a legal instruction that imposes some minimum
20 Note that the statute requires the Commonwealth to demon-
strate beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability of future
dangerousness. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990). This is very
different from proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the
unadjudicated acts which the Commonwealth uses to demonstrate the
future dangerousness of the defendant.
21 463 U.S. 992 (1982).
22 Id. at 999 (emphasis in original).
23 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
("Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
year rison term differs from one of only a year or two").
24 Lockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis added);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 ("Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case").
25 See, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, Nos. 920810 & 920811,
1993 Va. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 26, 1993); Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242
Va. 107, 406 S.E.2d 39 (1991). See case summary of Saunders,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 19 (1992).
26 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1982) (arguing that
the function of an aggravating circumstance is to narrow the class of
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty).
See also Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1989)
(arguing that future dangerousness and other aggravating circum-
stances are part of means to narrow class of persons who receive the
death penalty).
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veneer of reliability on the jury's use of such unadjudicated evi-
dence.
27
Standards of proof are the means of ensuring that the jury's
decision is properly based upon the evidence presented. The Supreme
Court has explained that:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied
in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding is to
"instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." The stan-
dard serves to allocate the risk of errorbetween the litigants and
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision.
28
Just as a factfinder in a guilt trial must consider the evidence offered in
light of a proof standard, so must a sentencer in a penalty trial appraise
the information presented with some level of confidence. To provide no
guidance to the sentencer on what standard of proof is necessary for the
use of an alleged unadjudicated act is to invite the arbitrary use of highly
prejudicial allegations that have never been scrutinized under any legal
standard of proof.29 This does not comport with the "correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination"
30
required by due process.
2. Reasonable Doubt as the Proper Standard
Although the Supreme Court has stated as a general proposition that
the reasonable doubt rule does not normally apply to sentencing, 31 the
Court has added that the reasonable doubt rule is implicated if the
challenged factor "exposed [the defendant] to greater or additional
punishment,"'32 or if the defendant is faced with a "'radically different
situation' from the usual sentencing proceedings." 33 In these types of
cases, "Winship's reasonable-doubt requirement applies to facts not
27 Use of the defendant's criminal record of convictions, on the
other hand, is not offensive to due process so long as it is limited to
relevant information speaking to defendant's propensity to be a future
threat to society, i.e. crimes of a violent nature. Such matters consist of
prior adjudicated criminal acts which have sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity in that they are conclusively determined; provided, however, thattheir
admission into evidence is not deemed too prejudicial against the
defendant.
The use of defendant's adjudicated criminal conduct has been
recognized repeatedly by the Virginia Supreme Court. See, e.g., Watkins
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469,331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1099 (1986); Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844,284 S.E.2d
844 (1981); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 302 S.E.2d 520,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202 (1983); Bunch v. Common-
wealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (asserting that the presence or
absence of a criminal record is pertinent to future dangerousness), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
28 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re
Winshi, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
29Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("[W] where discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action."). Cf. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1982) (arguing that in
addressing the matter of weighing the significance of statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances, the trial court need not channel the jury's discretion
by enunciating the specific standards to guide consideration).
30 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-999 (1982) (footnote
formally identified as elements of the offense charged."
'34
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,35 the Supreme Court upheld a statu-
tory provision which subjected the defendant to a mandatory minimum
sentence when the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of a
statutory offense. According to the Court, the ruling was consistent with
due process because the visible possession of a firearm was a sentencing
factor rather than an element of the offense; the factor was considered
only after the defendant had been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the underlying offense. 36 Additionally, the statute merely increased
the possible minimum sentence; it did not raise the maximum punish-
ment nor create a separate offense with a separate penalty.
37
In contrast, the use of unadjudicated acts at capital sentencing falls
within the ambit of McMillan's exceptions. Unlike McMillan's case
where the firearm factor did not expose the defendant to a penalty he
otherwise would not face, a capital defendant cannot receive the death
penalty unless an aggravating factor is found. Thus, to allow unadjudicated
acts to form a basis for the aggravating factor of future dangerousness is
to "expose [the defendant] to greater or additional punishment. ' ' 38 And,
as the Court has noted many times in its opinions, the death penalty is a
"'radically different situation' from the usual sentencing proceedings."'39
One radical difference being, of course, that capital sentencing carries
special concerns for reliability,40 which reinforces the reasons why the
use of unadjudicated acts falls within Winship and McMillan's require-
ments for the reasonable doubt rule.
4 1
C. A Comparison: Admissibility of Unadjudicated
Acts Evidence in Other Jurisdictions
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on the
admissibility of prior unadjudicated conduct by a defendant at a capital
sentencing hearing,42 the states are divided in their approaches to, and
treatment of, unadjudicated acts evidence in the capital context.4 3 The
Commonwealth of Virginia, however, stands as one of only fourjurisdic-
omitted).
31 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1985) ("[I]n
Patterson [v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1976)] we rejected the claim that
whenever a State links the 'severity of the punishment' to 'the presence
or absence of an identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt") (citing Patterson at 214).
32 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
33 Id. at 89 (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)).
34 Id. at 86.
35 477 U.S. 79 (1985).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 88.
39 Id. at 89 (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)).
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
40 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Cf. Hildwin v.
Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989) ("Like the visible possession of a
firearm inMcMillan, the existence of an aggravating factor here is not an
element of the offense but instead is a 'sentencing factor that comes into
play only after the defendant has been found guilty') (citing McMillan
at 86). Note, however, that Hildwin concerns the existence of an
aggravating factor generally and not evidence of a prior unadjudicated
act offered as an aggravating factor without the benefit of a standard of
proof. Even the visible firearm offered as a sentence enhancer in
McMillan had to be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.
42 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
43 See Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935,937 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing jurisdictions with diverse perspectives).
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tions which allows admission of such evidence without promulgating
any standard by which it should be judged.44
In some jurisdictions, the use of unadjudicated act evidence has
been found so offensive to the state constitution that those states do not
allow unadjudicated acts to be admitted at all, under any standard of
proof, for purposes of capital sentencing. 45 The rationale expressed by
the states prohibiting the admission of such evidence is a concern for the
lack of reliability and resulting prejudice against the defendant in
violation of state statutes and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Federal Constitution. 46 For example, in State v. Bartholomew, the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that evidence of prior
unadjudicated criminal activity at the penalty phase is prejudicial,
unreliable, irrelevant and fundamentally unfair.47 The remaining juris-
dictions that allow the admission ofunadjudicated acts in capital sentenc-
ing at least require notice and some standard of proof or provide other
means of guaranteeing the reliability of the evidence. The state of
Florida, for instance, admits only prior convictions as evidence of
aggravation while absolutely prohibiting admission of unadjudicated
acts which are allegations, arrests or even pending charges.4 8 Similarly,
South Dakota permits evidence of only prior serious assaultive criminal
convictions.49 Many jurisdictions specifically require notice of evi-
dence to be used in aggravation so that counsel may effectively defend
against the acts presented.50 In addition, a number of jurisdictions
require, at a minimum, that the basic evidentiary standards for admissi-
bility of other act evidence at the guilt trial be met by evidence used in
aggravation at the penalty phase.5 1 Finally, in jurisdictions where state
legislatures have failed to ensure proper standards of reliability of
unadjudicated act evidence, the courts have provided for appropriate
guidance of the sentencer.
52
44 The four jurisdictions are Virginia, Texas, Georgia, and Ne-
braska. See supra note 16 (citing Virginia cases); See also, e.g., Milton
v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981); Fair v. State, 268 S.E.2d 316, 319-20
(Ga.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980); State v. Reeves, 453 N.W.2d
359, 375 (Neb. 1990).
45 See, e.g., State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 952-53 (Tenn.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987); State v. McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276,280
(Ind. 1979); Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 1257 (Ala. 1978); State v.
Bartholomew, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085-86 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
46 Reeves, 453 N.W.2d at 371.
47 Bartholomew, 683 P.2d at 1082-85.
48 See, e.g., Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 925 (1981); Perty v. State, 395 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1980). But see
Walton v. State, 547 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1989) (holding that state can present
evidence of criminal activity for which convictions were not obtained to
rebut defendant's assertion that he lacked significant history of prior
criminal activity).
49 S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-1 (1989).
50 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-2515 (1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5
(1992); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-
102 (1992).
51 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (1989); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-4-604 (Michie 1991); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a (West 1985).
52 See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 368 S.E.2d 457 (S.C. 1988)
(holding that trial judge must charge the jury and caution members as
to manner of considering the evidence); People v. Devin, 444 N.E.2d
102 (Ill. 1982) (explaining that the only requirement is that evidence
be relevant and reliable but the use of such evidence should be
carefully guided).
53 See generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681
(1988) (without regard to the capital context, holding that the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow admissibility of other unadjudicated crimes
Still otherjurisdictions have imposed particularstandards of proof.
53
At least two jurisdictions have declared, for instance, that such evidence
may notbe considered in capital sentencing unless demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence.54 Louisiana decided on a clear and convincing
standard for the defendant's unadjudicated acts at the penalty stage
reasoning that such acts must be proven by at least the same standard used
for admission of evidence of unrelated crimes during the guilt phase.
55
And at least two otherjurisdictions have gone even farther, declaring that
such evidence may not be admitted in capital sentencing unless demon-
strated beyond a reasonable doubt.56 Relying on the greater need for
reliability in capital sentencing, California and Utah both require the
prosecution to prove unadjudicated acts in the capital context at a higher
standard (beyond a reasonable doubt) than the preponderance standard
used for admission of evidence of unrelated crimes at the guilt phase of
a trial.
57
If Virginia continues to admit evidence of prior unadjudicated acts
of a capital defendant, the Commonwealth should look to the California
Supreme Court's reasoning in deciding the standard of proof required in
offering such information. 58 Although the general rule in California is
that the standard of competency for evidence at the penalty trial is the
same as the standard required at guilt trial, i.e. a preponderance of the
evidence, 59 the court reasoned that "[s]ince evidence of other crimes..
. may have a particularly damaging impact on the jury's determination
whether the defendant should be executed . . . there should be an
exception to the normal standard of proof at the [penalty trial]."'60
Therefore, a higher standard is imposed to meet the enhanced require-
ment of reliability at capital sentencing.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, likewise, should recognize that
evidence used in its capital sentencing determinations must carry the
if demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence). Note, however,
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not specifically address the
subject of standards of proof in sentencing determination. U.S. v.
Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1989). Some jurisdictions
have required a clear and convincing standard while others have
suggested that a "sufficient indicia of reliability" may be upheld. Id.
at 1237-38 (citing cases). Recently, though, "courts examining the
appropriate standard of proof under the guidelines have generally agreed
that a preponderance standard is the proper measure." Id. at 1238
(citations omitted).
54 State v. Wilson, 385 A.2d 304 (N.J. 1978) (ruling that trial court
properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior behavior who was
charged with the murder of her son because acts of child abuse were
proven by clear and convincing evidence); State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d
801,814 (La. 1989) (holding that "evidence of unadjudicated crimes at
the sentencing phase of the trial will be admissible once a trial court
determines: 1) the evidence of defendant's connection with commission
of the unrelated crimes is clear and convincing; 2) the proffered evidence
is otherwise competent and reliable; and 3) the unrelated crimes have
relevance and substantial probative value as to the defendant's character
and propensities, which is focus of the sentencing hearing underLa.C.Cr.P.
art. 905.2.").
55 Brooks, 541 So.2d 801.
56 See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); People
v. Howard, 749 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1988); People v. Balderas, 711 P.2d 480
(Cal. 1985). See also People v. Robertson, 655 P.2d 279,298 (Cal. 1983);
People v. Stanworth, 457 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1969); People v.McClellan, 457
P.2d 871,879 (Cal. 1969); People v. Polk,406 P.2d 641,646 (Cal. 1965).
57 Id.
58 Balderas, 711 P.2d at 516, n. 33 (asserting that only the
reasonable doubt standard ensures sufficient reliability so that the
evidence is not improperly prejudicial or unfair).
59 Polk, 406 P.2d at 646.
60 Id. (citations omitted).
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appropriate indicia of reliability. Of the thirty-seven jurisdictions that
permit capital punishment in the United States, Virginia and three other
states stand alone in admitting unadjudicated act evidence in pursuit of
the death penalty with no procedural safeguards beyond a trial judge
finding the evidence "relevant." Without any meaningful standards of
reliability or notice or guidance of the sentencer's discretion, the Com-
monwealth does not comply with the defendant's constitutional safe-
guards in a capital case and would not withstand a challenge at the United
States Supreme Court.
IV. NOTICE AND DUE PROCESS
The use of unadjudicated acts forproof offuture dangerousness also
compromises the defendant's due process rights to notice and a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard. A defendant in Virginia who has just been
convicted of capital murder is faced with a sentencing hearing in which
the Commonwealth may present any information concerning the
defendant's character or the circumstances of the offense which may be
relevant to sentencing. 61 When the Commonwealth offers evidence of
defendant's prior behavior to impress upon the jury the future threat to
society which the defendant poses, the defendant may have no idea what
the jury is about to hear. Virginia case law reveals that the use of
defendant's prior behavior supporting the future dangerousness aggra-
vating factor can consist of virtually anything. Courts have allowed
observations about the defendant's general character orhistory, 62 admis-
sions and confessions of crimes similar to that charged, 63 and other
allegations of behavior non-criminal in nature.64 Because nearly any act
of the defendant could be considered prior unadjudicated conduct, the
Commonwealth has few parameters to constrain it. Indeed, without
definition or indication of what constitutes an unadjudicated act, the
Commonwealth can and does present a litany of allegations with varying
levels of severity and the defendant is left with the impossible task of
countering each and every implication or innuendo made by the prosecu-
tion.
65
Beyond the problem a defendant encounters in not knowing what
the Commonwealth could use against him, the defendant is not granted
any notice of evidence the Commonwealth will use against him.
66
Evidence of prior unadjudicated behavior is to be used against the
defendantby a sentencing jury when the defendant has not been accorded
any hearing on the issues. Admission of evidence at the penalty trial of
prior unadjudicated criminal acts results in an inability to exercise a
meaningful opportunity to defend himself because he has not been given
61 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,345 S.E.2d 267
(1986) (allowing evidence of the defendant's lack of remorse); Beaver v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521,352 S.E.2d 342 (allowing evidence of the
defendant's juvenile record), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987).
63 Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987); Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,356
S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987); Poyner v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985).
64 Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482,404 S.E.2d 227 (199 1)
(allowing evidence that the defendant tampered with a vending machine
and boasted about his commission of the crime); King v. Commonwealth,
243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992) (permitting evidence of the
defendant's unauthorized possession of money, drug paraphernalia, and
intoxicants while in jail); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410
S.E.2d 254 (1991) (allowing evidence that the defendant sent a letter to
a neighbor ordering him to stay away from defendant's girlfriend).
65 See, e.g., King, 243 Va. at369-70,416 S.E.2d at 678-79. InKing,
the prosecution introduced the following evidence at a 1990 capital
sentencing trial: King's 1975 conviction of bank robbery, use of a
firearm in the commission of the robbery, and abduction; 1976 convic-
tion of carrying a concealed weapon; 1976 conviction for contributing to
notice as required by due process.67 It would be impossible for a
defendant to adequately defend against all allegations first revealed to
him only when asserted before the jury.
68
In the context of variances between indictment and proof, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that "the obvious requirements
[are] ... that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges
against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be
taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial... -"69 If one applies
this most basic principle to the use of unadjudicated acts to prove future
dangerousness, the fundamental unfairness is evident. To inform the
defendant only that the Commonwealth will rely on future dangerous-
ness but not to specify the acts is like a defendant being indicted for a
crime without any notice as to the alleged facts surrounding the incident.
Such a Kafkaesque scenario would be a blatant violation of due process
if it occurred during the guilt phase, yet is a regular feature of penalty
hearings in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has extended due process notice requirements to capital
sentencing, 70 and this may supply the portal through which such prac-
tices can now be challenged.
V. VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
entitles a defendant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him. It is well settled that the Sixth Amendment
entitles a defendant to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial as well as the guilt/innocence phase of the capital
trial.71 If the Commonwealth is permitted to introduce evidence of prior
unadjudicated misconduct of the defendant at the penalty trial, defendant
must be permitted effective representation to defend against those
accusations.
Yet defense counsel, when faced with the potential admissibility of
any number of unadjudicated acts by the defendant, must investigate and
attempt to uncover any possible evidence which could be included as
unadjudicated acts evidence. To avoid surprise and counter the
Commonwealth's evidence as effectively as possible, counsel must
prepare mini-trials on any potential bad act from the defendant's past,
including jail time while awaiting trial. Given the law in place, the only
way to effectively counteract the Commonwealth's evidence of future
dangerousness is to anticipate what the evidence might be and attack each
item.
the delinquency of a minor;, 1976 failed attempt to rob a bank in which
King made a fake bomb, carried a pistol, and threatened to kill his co-
conspirator;, 1982 conviction of petit larceny; 1990 conviction of bigamy;
1989 act of entering home of first wife with second wife and knocking
door in, jerking phone out of wall, threatening first wife with pistol and
shooting it in the air; various parole violations involving assault, destruc-
tion of property, traffic offenses and technical violations of parole rules;
various institutional violations while imprisoned such as filling out false
prescriptions and inducing girlfriend to make drug deliveries to him,
unauthorized possession of currency, drug paraphernalia, intoxicants,
marijuana, and being under the influence of intoxicants.
66But see Author's note, supra, and Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:2
(1993). In comparison, note that the 1992 Amendment to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b) addresses this concern and requires that pre-trial
notice of prior bad acts must be given to the defendant in federal criminal
cases.
67 See generallyLankford v. Idaho, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 1733, (1991);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
68 See infra Part V.
69 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
70 Lankford, 111 S.Ct. 1723.
71 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Even the best attorney could not effectively provide assistance
under such circumstances. In effect, it is as if defense counsel were
appointed the morning of a trial without the benefit of notice or discov-
ery. Counsel has been afforded no time because she receives the
information concurrently with the jury. She has had no opportunity to
investigate, and the jury has been given no level of scrutiny by which the
evidence will be judged.
The Commonwealth's ability to introduce evidence ofunadjudicated
acts under these conditions is a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in that it undermines the adversarial process
as described in United States v. Cronic.72 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that some circumstances can occur in which "counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing... [making] the adversary process itself presumptively unreli-
able.' 73 The Commonwealth's use of unadjudicated acts creates such
circumstances. It is an instance where a court need "not examine the
actual performance of counsel at trial, but instead [must] conclude[] that
under these circumstances the likelihood that counsel could have per-
formed as an effective adversary was so remote as to have made the trial
inherently unfair."
'74
Requiring the accused to defend against unadjudicated acts with-
out adequate notice offends the notion of fairness in the adversarial
system. Defense counsel cannot possibly be expected to defend against
all conceivable accusations made against the defendant at the sentencing
phase when the defendant has just been found guilty of capital murderby
the same jury. Circumstances of great magnitude may be present on
some occasions when, even though counsel is available to assist the
accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully compe-
tent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that the court must
presume prejudice.
75
VI. CHALLENGING UNADJUDICATED ACTS
AS IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL
The admission of unadjudicated acts, like the admission of any
evidence, requires that the information presented be relevant to the
matter at issue. Where unadjudicated act evidence is proffered, the issue
will be whether the act is in fact probative of Virginia's aggravating
factors.76 In particular, unadjudicated acts must speak to whether the
defendant poses a future threat to society.77 If the acts offered do not
make such an indication, they are irrelevant and cannot be admitted.
78
72 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
73 Id. at 659.
74 Id. at 660-61 (citingPowell v.Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,58 (1932)).
75 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 646-47.
76 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
77 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303,329 S.E.2d 807, cert.
denied,475 U.S. 975 (1985). SeeVa. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
78 See Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 196-97,
361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987) (explaining that evidence is relevant if it
tends to establish a proposition toward which it is offered).
79 Dawson v.Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992). See case summary
of Dawson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 6 (1992).
80 Id. at 1098.
81 Id. at 1096.
82 See Penty v. Lynaugh,492 U.S. 302,319 (1989) ("[Plunishment
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
defendant") (relying on Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)).
83 Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 196-76, 361
The United States Supreme Court recently struggled with the
problem of what constitutes relevant evidence for future dangerous-
ness.79 In Dawson, the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence
because a stipulation that the defendant was a member of a white racist
prison gang was introduced at the penalty phase as evidence of future
dangerousness. 80 In this case, admission of the evidence was not proper
because the narrow stipulation - simply that the group that the defen-
dant belonged to holds racist beliefs81 - was not tied to the murder of
the victim and thus was not relevant to the sentencing proceeding. Thus,
although the Dawson Court formally struck down the aggravating
evidence because its associational nature violated the First Amendment,
the case reemphasizes the requirement that evidence directly bear on the
defendant's culpability.
82
Even if the prior acts are deemed relevant by the court, they must be
excluded if their prejudicial impact outweighs the evidence's probative
value.83 In assessing the probative value, the court should consider the
necessity of the evidence and its reliability. 84 Other factors helpful in
assessing the probative value of the evidence are the similarity of the acts
to the offense charged and the temporal proximity to the crime for which
the defendant stands trial.85 Although these rules of evidence are
propounded in the context of a guilt trial, the dangers to which they are
addressed are also present in capital sentencing. Evidence admitted in
the sentencing phase, like that at the guilt phase, must be more probative
than it is prejudicial. 86 "The responsibility for balancing these compet-
ing considerations is largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge
[and] a trial judge's discretionary ruling will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion."
87
The danger of prejudice by the admission of defendant's prior
unadjudicated conduct is especially great because of the incremental and
cumulative effect it has upon the jury. When a number of accusations are
made, the evidence presented will make a very strong and prejudicial
impact upon the jury as it is considered in the aggregate. Inevitably, its
admission will confuse the issues and mislead the jury as to the subject
of its deliberations; instead of analyzing the evidence for indications of
future dangerousness, the jury will feel that the defendant should be
punished for those activities rather than for the crime of whichhe was just
convicted. The rules of evidence are designed to protect against this very
danger.88 Given the importance of safeguarding reliability in capital
sentences, 89 a sentencing jury should not be given such highly prejudi-
cial information about the defendant.
S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987).
84 United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1142 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637,639 (4th Cir. 1981); United States
v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1974).
85 United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
86 But see, e.g., George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264,273,411
S.E.2d 12,18 (1991) (ruling that trial court properly admitted as relevant
to future dangerousness, as an indication of a "life long character flaw,"
evidence that the defendanthad been cruel to animals twenty years before
the offense, despite the "emotional aspects" of the evidence).
87 Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823
(1986). This rule is particularly troubling given the higher degree of
scrutiny required in capital sentencing determinations. See California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1982) ("[Ihe qualitative difference of
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination") (footnote
omitted).
88 Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914.
89 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
TACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
A. The Challenge
When representing a client who has just been convicted of capital
murder and now stands trial to see whether he will be allowed to live or
die, defense counsel is faced with a tremendous challenge. For the
Commonwealth to pursue a sentence of death, the prosecutor must prove
vileness or future dangerousness. 90 If the Commonwealth intends to
impress upon the sentencer the future threat that the defendant poses to
society, it will be permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior
behavior and character speaking to that issue.91 Defense counsel must
be armed with the ammunition to attack the Commonwealth's use of
unadjudicated acts which will be devastating to the defendant at sentenc-
ing. While posing policy and constitutional arguments to the court will
be essential for federalizing the arguments for any appeal, ultimately, the
attorney's best hope is to challenge particular unadjudicated acts on
statutory and evidentiary grounds. The objective is to increase the
court's disposition to consider the matter through constitutional chal-
lenges and then succeed in the motion for excluding particular
unadjudicated acts.
B. Notice
The first step in the process is to pin the prosecution down on notice
grounds. This may be accomplished initially by filing a pretrial motion
for a bill of particulars. 92 If the Commonwealth replies in its answer that
it will rely on one of the factors, it will be precluded from introducing
evidence of the other factor during sentencing.93 Thus, if the Common-
wealth intends to rely on the vileness predicate, it will not be allowed to
introduce evidence of prior unadjudicated acts of the defendant at all.
If the Commonwealth indicates that it will rely on evidence of future
dangerousness as its basis for a sentence of death, defense counsel should
begin with a blanket motion to exclude all unadjudicated acts in the
present case.94 This calls for a general motion which must then be
tailored to the facts of the client's background. Counsel should anticipate
denial of her request for exclusion of unadjudicated acts overall and be
prepared to argue in the alternative that such evidence only be permitted
in thejury's consideration if demonstrated by a reliable standard ofproof,
i.e. the reasonable doubt standard.
95
Counsel should also keep in mind that the Commonwealth must
comply with a court's order to reveal the grounds upon which it intends
to rely for proof of future dangerousness within a reasonable amount of
time before trial. If the prosecution fails to provide such notice within a
reasonable time before trial to allow for defense investigation and
preparation pertaining to evidence of future dangerousness, including
prior unadjudicated conduct, the defendant may rely on due process
90 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
91 Id.
92 In addition, defense counsel should file a motion requesting
notice of unadjudicated acts evidence pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:2 (1993). See also Author's note, supra.The Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse urges defense attorneys in every case to file a motion
requesting the court to require the Commonwealth to reveal whether it
intends to rely upon vileness or future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor in its pursuit of a capital sentence. The bill of particulars also
should request the grounds upon which the Commonwealth bases its
factors in aggravation.
93 See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289,296,302 S.E.2d
520,525 (1983). Cf. Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,402
S.E.2d 218 (1991) (holding that a capital defendant is not entitled, as a
matter of right, to a bill of particulars on aggravating factors). See case
grounds to exclude the introduction of such evidence altogether.
96
Again, the inquiry will be very fact-based and success will depend upon
the advocacy of counsel.
C. Relevance and Prejudice
Having been given notice of the Commonwealth's intention to
present evidence of defendant's unadjudicated criminal conduct, a
defense attorney is also called upon to demonstrate to the court that the
particular acts which the prosecution plans to introduce are not indicative
of defendant's propensity for future danger. Defense counsel in this
position should challenge the Commonwealth's use of the conduct
evidence on relevance grounds. The Commonwealth is concededly
permitted to introduce character evidence within the context of future
dangerousness but the Commonwealth is not permitted to present a
litany of bad acts in an effort to persuade thejury that the defendant is just
"a really bad guy" who deserves to die.97 The purpose of the sentencing
trial is to determine an appropriate penalty for a single capital crime,
98
not to punish the defendant for all of the things he may or may not have
done in his life. For this reason it is imperative to impress upon the judge
that the alleged acts have no relevance and must be excluded at sentenc-
ing because they do not bear on the issue of future dangerousness. Even
if the court deems such behavior relevant to future dangerousness,
defense counsel must make a compelling argument for the prejudicial
impact that the cumulative presentation of such evidence will have upon
a sentencing jury.99 The defendant should not have to bear the risk of
being sentenced to die because of the overwhelming effect that evidence,
which has not even been determined by any level of proof, will have upon
a jury.
Should the court permit the Commonwealth to introduce prior
unadjudicated behavior at the defendant's sentencing hearing, counsel
should be attentive to the evidentiary grounds upon which each accusa-
tion is raised. It is very important here to make the Commonwealth do
its job. Defense counsel should consider each allegation as if it were
another incident on which there should be a mini-trial. Make sure that
foundations are properly laid, that witnesses are properly qualified, and
that all evidence is properly introduced. The prosecution should be put
to the test on each and every item it attempts to introduce.
D. Double Jeopardy
Another matter for defense counsel to consider in this situation is the
potential for a double jeopardy claim. The Commonwealth is attempting
to introduce evidence of actions previously committed by the defendant.
If the defendant has been charged and previously acquitted of that
conduct, the grounds of the accusation have already been rejected by a
neutral jury which determined that the defendant was not guilty of the
summary of Quesinberry, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4. No. 1, p. 23.
See also Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Although the trial court ruled that the jury
could consider the aggravating circumstance of vileness but not future
dangerousness, it was not error for the trial court to permit the
Commonwealth's attorney to comment on evidence which pertained to
future dangerousness in closing argument.
94 The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse has a motion which is
based on the grounds posed in this article and has been successful at the
trial court level.
95 See supra Part 11-B.
96 See supra Parts IV & V.
97 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
98 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (1990)
99 See supra Part VI.
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offense and, as such, can not be held accountable for it.100 The
Commonwealth, constitutionally, cannot use such evidence against the
defendant as an indication of his propensity to commit future violent acts.
E. Voir Dire
If the possibility exists that the Commonwealth will introduce
evidence of the defendant's prior unadjudicated acts at sentencing,
defense counsel should attempt to diminish the effect or impact that the
information will have by gauging jurors' attitudes at voir dire. Qualify-
ing a jury for a capital case provides counsel with the opportunity to
inquire into such matters. Defense counsel will want to know in advance
how susceptible a juror will be to implications that a defendant, if found
guilty of one crime, is likely to be guilty of other crimes as well. Such
a perspective will be particularly damaging in cases where the defendant
also has a history of prior convictions, 101 where the testimony of a victim
from a prior crime is sought to be introduced,1 02 and where defendant's
prior statements or confessions are admitted. 103 In such a case, it will be
important for defense counsel to sensitize the jury by stressing standards
of reliability and ascertaining the level of confidence that a juror must
have before believing that an event has occurred. In this context, defense
counsel should keep in mind the nature of the community and the "shock
value" of the prior acts. Voir dire should reveal those things that might
produce a strong reaction so as to inflame certain members (such as drug
use or theft). It would be worth exploring the jurors' perceptions of such
conduct that was not part of the underlying crime.
F. Jury Instruction
If the court decides to allow evidence of unadjudicated acts, counsel
should request that reliability concerns be addressed through a jury
instruction requiring that evidence of prior conduct may not be consid-
ered in deliberations of future dangerousness unless such conduct has
been demonstrated beyond areasonable doubt. This requirement assures
that a jury has determined that the alleged criminal conduct actually
occurred. Certainly, defense counsel must submit that some standard of
proof be promulgated before it is used in sentencing the defendant to
death, even if only by a clear and convincing or a preponderance
standard. Such an instruction for future dangerousness might read:
Members of the jury, as you know, the purpose of a
sentencing trial is to determine the appropriate punishment for
the single crime of which you have convicted the defendant.
You must now decide whether the defendant is subject to life
imprisonment or to death for his part in the commission of that
crime.
Before you may sentence the defendant to death, the
Commonwealth must demonstrate to you beyond a reasonable
100 Counsel should be prepared to explalin why Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), is not controlling. In Dowling, the Court
found that admission under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) of a crime for which the
defendant had previously been acquitted did not violate double jeopardy
or due process. The Court seemed to rule out such a claim because the
burden of proof for "other acts" evidence - that the jury "reasonably
conclude" that the defendant did the act - was less than the reasonable
doubt standard for an acquittal. Id. at 347-50. The court later appeared
to hold out the possibility that the Double Jeopardy Clause might apply
if the prior acquittal clearly was based upon a finding that the defendant
was not the perpetrator. Id. at 350-52 (indicating that even if double
jeopardy applied, the defendant did not show that the acquittal was based
upon someone else being the perpetrator). At a minimum, the Court
acknowledged that such evidence "has the potential to prejudice the jury
doubt the existence of an aggravating factor, beyond the com-
mission of the crime. For you to impose a capital sentence, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society.
You have heard evidence of prior criminal conduct which
the Commonwealth alleges the defendant committed. Such
evidence may not enterinto yourconsideration of the defendant's
future dangerousness unless you determine beyond a reason-
able doubt that such conduct was actually committed by the
defendant and that such conduct tends to establish defendant's
propensity to commit future acts of violence.
You are not to punish the defendant for the commission of
the alleged conduct; rather, your function is to determine
whether such conduct occurred and whether, on the basis of
future dangerousness, its existence elevates the appropriate
penalty, from life imprisonment to death, for the single capital
crime of which the defendant has been convicted.
Even if you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that such conduct occurred and that the defendant poses a future
threat to society, you may, none the less, sentence the defendant
to life in prison.
If no instruction is granted on the Commonwealth's use of
unadjudicated acts, it is imperative that defense counsel emphasize in
closing that the prosecution's evidence of prior unadjudicated conduct
has neverbeen established, never been tried in a court of law, and that the
members of the jury are not required to give it the weight which the
prosecution seems to indicate is suitable. Indeed, the jury need not give
it any weight at all if that is what the jury deems appropriate.
G. Use of Expert Testimony
In some cases, the use of unadjudicated acts evidence may be
softened through the use of expert testimony demonstrating the difficul-
ties in determining, and inability to predict, future dangerousness.
Indeed, a medical, psychological or sociological expert104 may be very
effective at communicating to the jury the lack of reliability in using the
defendant's actions to determine his likelihood of being a future threat to
society. If defense counsel is able to impress upon the jury that the
particular acts presented by the Commonwealth, even if true, do not
indicate with certainty that the defendant will pose serious danger in the
future, the jury likely will be unable to give the unadjudicated acts
evidence the weight it otherwise would have upon the Commonwealth's
urging.
or unfairly force the defendant to spend time and money relitigating
matters considered at the first trial," but urged that the problem be dealt
with under the rules of evidence. Id. at 352 and n. 4 (noting, without
addressing, that the lower court found that the introduction of evidence
violated Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 404).
101 See, e.g., supra note 27.
102 See, e.g., Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,257 S.E.2d
808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
103 See, e.g., Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401,329 S.E.2d
815 (1985). -
104 Such testimony has been used successfully in Virginia capital
cases. Contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for reference to
such experts on the predictability of future dangerousness.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The use of unadjudicated acts for proof of future dangerousness in
capital sentencing violates the defendant's rights under the Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The presentation of such evidence with no
articulated standard of proof or cautionary instructions by the judge to
guide the jury in its penalty determination fails to meet the reliability
standards required in capital sentencing procedures. Admission of the
alleged conduct deprives the defendant of the notice, process, and
effective assistance of counsel to which he is entitled during the penalty
phase. Ultimately, if relevant at all to the issue of future dangerousness,
the acts as presented collectively are more prejudicial than probative of
defendant's potential future threat to society. Defense counsel must meet
the Commonwealth's attack by challenging each unadjudicated act and
defeating the overall effect such information could have on a sentencing
jury.
THE "TWO-EDGED" SWORD:
MITIGATION EVIDENCE USED IN AGGRAVATION
BY: CHARLES F. CASTNER
I. INTRODUCTION
In many capital cases, there really is little question of whether the
defendant actually committed the murder. The main issue in the trial
occurs during the penalty phase, when the jury is asked to answer the
question of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life in
prison. Therefore, the mitigation evidence offered in the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial can be the most important part of the trial for the
defendant. The defense lawyer must make sure that he or she has
prepared a strong theme for mitigation and that the mitigation evidence
is used only to support an argument for mitigation.
One problem which defense lawyers must be prepared to deal with
is mitigation evidence that could be used by the prosecution or viewed by
the jury to support the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.1
When the defense relies on the diminished capacity of the defendant or
his inability to "conform his conduct to the requirements of law, ' 2 the
same evidence could be used by the prosecution to argue that the
defendant poses a future danger to society because the defendant will
always suffer from the mental deficiency. The defense lawyer must be
prepared to prevent the prosecutor from posing this argument and to
proactively focus the jury's attention on the mitigating aspects of this
evidence.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
In Zant v. Stephens,3 the United States Supreme Court stated that if
the state had attached an aggravating label to "conduct that actually
should militate in favor of alesserpenalty, such as perhaps the defendant's
mental illness," then "due process of law would require that the jury's
decision to impose death be set aside." Stephens' prohibition of the use
of mitigating evidence in such a fashion is best understood in light of the
Supreme Court's holdings concerning the defendant's right to introduce
mitigating evidence.
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Lockett v. Ohio,
4
"that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Based on this reasoning, the Court found an Ohio death penalty
statute which restricted the range of mitigating circumstances that could
be considered by the sentencer to be unconstitutional.
5
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (B) (iv) (1990). The Virginia
sentencing proceeding statute identifies this evidence as mitigating.
3 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
4 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
5 Id. at 608.
The constitutional right of a defendant to present any relevant
mitigating factor and to have it be considered was reaffirmed in Eddings
v. Oklahoma.6 In applying the holding of Lockett, Justice Powell stated
that "just as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. ' 7 Read
together, Lockett and Eddings stand for the proposition that the defendant
must be allowed to present any relevant mitigating circumstances and
that the sentencer, whether it be judge or jury, must consider the
mitigating nature of the evidence. The weight to be given the evidence
is still left to the sentencer's discretion, but the sentencer may not refuse
to consider the evidence.
The right of the defendant to present any relevant mitigating evi-
dence, and the responsibility of the sentencer to consider the mitigating
evidence, would not mean anything unless the sentencer could give
effect to that evidence. Thus, in Penry v. Lynaugh,8 the Supreme Court
held that the sentencer must be able to give effect to the mitigating
evidence in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment. The Court recognized that the sentencer must
have the ability to give effect to the mitigating circumstance if they were
to uphold the underlying principle of Lockett and Eddings: that punish-
ment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
defendant.9 Justice O'Connor stated:
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty, "evidence about the
defendant's background and character is relevant because of
the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse."10
In order to protect a defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence in mitigation of the defendant's mental or emotional problem,
and to have that evidence considered and given effect by the sentencer,
the prosecution must not be allowed to penalize the defendant's exercis-
ing of a constitutional right by using this same evidence for the purpose
of proving an aggravating factor. In addition, the jury must be cautioned
that they may not consider the evidence offered in mitigation as proof of
an aggravating factor. The danger of this happening was noted by Justice
O'Connor in Penry, stating that "Penry's mental retardation and history
6 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
7 Id. at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
8 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
9 Id. at 319.
10 Id. at319 (quotingCaliforniav.Brown,479 U.S. 538,545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
